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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=~Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=íê~åëáíáçå======== - 262 - 
=
=
When Instructions Provide Too Much Flexibility, Establish 
Rules Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Redux: 
Unpredictability, Uncertainty and Program Failure: 
Implementing a Rule-set Can Be the Fix 
Presenter/Author: J. David Patterson is the executive director of the National Defense Business 
Institute (NDBI) at the College of Business Administration, University of Tennessee.  He is the former 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and served as the executive director of the 
Department of Defense sponsored Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment study.  Additionally, he 
has served as the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.  He has been an executive in 
the defense industry and is a retired Air Force officer with 25 years of service.  NDBI was established to 
provide assistance and resources to both the Department of Defense and the Defense Industry to 
produce systems and equipment as well as provide services more effectively and efficiently.   
J. David Patterson 
Executive Director 
National Defense Business Institute 
College of Business Administration 
University of Tennessee 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996 
Email: dpatterson@utk.edu  
Research Assistant: Michael A. Ott is a Graduate Assistant working for the National Defense Business 
Institute. He is currently a graduate student in the University of Tennessee’s MBA program where he is 
studying Logistics.  He received his BS in Business Administration from Carson-Newman College in 2002. 
He was commissioned in 2002 as an Infantry Officer in the United States Army and served with the 101st 
Airborne (AASLT) before joining the United States Army Reserves in 2007. 
Michael A. Ott 
National Defense Business Institute 
College of Business Administration 
University of Tennessee 
mott2@utk.edu  
Editing Assistant: Ms. Eileen Giglio is Vice President, Acquisition and Technology for the Loch Harbour 
Group and provided valuable assistance in the writing of this paper as a subject-matter expert on the 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment.   She has served as the Assistant Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense, Strategic Plans and Initiatives—Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Business 
Transformation.  Ms. Giglio also served as the Deputy Director for the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment; she provided administrative direction and management throughout the duration of the study. 
3936 Colonel Ellis Avenue  




More than three years have passed since the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) project was completed and the results briefed to the study’s sponsor, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense.  In that time, the Department of Defense has issued its fourteenth 
major change to the Department’s Acquisition System management guidance. Combined with a 
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shortfall of experienced and skilled acquisition business professionals, the result is a pervasive 
and troubling level of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding defense acquisition programs.   
The resulting Acquisition System including Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE), Requirements and the little “a” Acquisition process lacks structure and discipline.  What 
follows is persistent failures to meet cost, schedule and performance objectives.  This paper 
presents a case for a mandatory set of Acquisition System rules to address this problem.  
Though by no means exhaustive, the recommended rules fit categories in the acquisition 
process, the requirements process and the PPBE process—referred to here simply as the 
“Budget Rules.”  The premise of this paper is that the right mandatory set of rules applied to 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs would result in weapon systems and equipment critical to 
warfighter success being fielded more rapidly on cost, on schedule and performing as expected. 
Introduction 
More than three years have passed since the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) project chaired by Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, USAF (Ret.) was 
completed in November 2006 and the results briefed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
study’s sponsor.  Since that time, there have been several more attempts to describe the root 
cause of the flaws in the Department’s Acquisition System.  Most studies cover the same 
ground plowed by the DAPA project and previous studies, dating back to the 1985 Packard 
Commission Report.  Despite these numerous evaluations of the Defense Acquisition System, 
none have advanced the discourse beyond what has been clear from the beginning.  There is a 
fundamental lack of a budget process and requirements discipline that leads inexorably to 
programs that are over cost, behind schedule and not performing.  Additionally, there is one 
factor that is common to serious analyses of the Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition 
System.   
The general discussion of reforming the Acquisition System with its many subsystems, 
procedures, and methodologies reveals that there is a basic failure to drive predictability 
regarding what the DoD can expect as a product (fielded weapon system) emerging from its 
acquisition process.  In fact there is seldom any effort to make “predictable outcome” a program 
management priority.  All program managers try to stay within budget or cost limits, meet 
schedule guidelines, and produce a weapon system or piece of equipment that performs to the 
level of stated requirements.  But, is there any real certainty that the program manager’s efforts, 
no matter how diligent, or adherence to the acquisition process will produce the desired result?  
The case presented here would answer, no.  The DAPA study raised the issue of the 
government’s inability to predict cost, schedule, and performance as a self-induced symptom of 
“instability” (Kadish, 2006, January).  It is that instability in acquisition programs that defeats 
efforts to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  
The Problem Explained 
Recent analyses of the troubles experienced in the DoD acquisition of weapons systems 
identify instability as a significant factor in program cost growth.  A 2008 RAND Corporation 
study on cost growth of fixed-wing military aircraft identified the “practice of rotating officers 
through jobs every three to four years” as creating an unstable program management workforce 
(Arena, Younossi, Brancato, Blickstein & Grammich, 2008).  This results in a management 
situation where experience gained in solving management problems is not effectively used over 
the term of the program and not available to those entering new to the program.  The Aerospace 
Industries Association, in its November 2008 Special Report, U.S. Defense Acquisition: An 
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Agenda for Positive Reform, raised instability as an area where the Defense Department should 
focus management attention.  
Two elements combine to create instability in the acquisition of weapon systems.  First, 
there seems to be no lasting agreement on what should be the DoD Acquisition System policy 
directions.  Since Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard issued the first DoD Directive 5000.1 in 
1971, the regulations documents have been revised significantly about every three years: 14 
times in 38 years.  As Charles Cochrane (2009, January 1) so masterfully revealed in his 
presentation Acquisition Management System from 1971 to 2008, the DoD 5000 series 
documents have provided direction varying from 8 pages to 840 pages of recommendations, 
suggestions, regulations, policy, procedures and definitions.  No single Acquisition System 
approach has survived for more than five years, while the length of time for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs to reach full operational capability is generally three times this Acquisition 
System regulation change cycle.  For the purposes of this paper, reference to the most recent 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (2008, December 8) shown in Figure 1,1 will be 
used. 
Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Management System 
(used to identify where rules described later in the paper will apply) 
Second, while the acquisition playing field is persistently changing, the workforce 
challenged with making the system successful has been reduced in numbers and experience.  
In the past, even though there were frequent modifications to the 5000 series Department 
guidance, there was also a cadre of experienced acquisition executives in the career ranks that 
could adjust with a modicum of disruption. The United States Senate and House Armed 
Services Committees, in their respective committee reports supporting the FY 2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act, were very concerned that the numbers, years of experience and skill 
levels of the professional acquisition workforce had reached unacceptably low levels (US 
Congress, 2008).  Particularly troublesome was the major reduction in the acquisition workforce 
within the Department of Defense during the 1990s, the workforce on whom the Department 
counted to make sense of the constantly changing 5000 series Department guidance. 
                                                
1 Adapted for use in this paper from the graphic presented on page 12 of the DoDI 5000.02. 
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However well-intentioned and necessary the Department’s changes to the 5000 series 
guidelines were thought to be, the consequence was instability in acquisition programs—an 
unfortunate result of a purposeful action by department management.  Instability drives 
uncertainty, creating an Acquisition System environment where the program outcome is 
unpredictable.  When the program outcome is unpredictable, program risk is increased.  There 
is a corresponding drive to reduce risk by increasing the cost as a premium or hedge against 
uncertainty.  When the workforce does not have the experience to deal with program risk, 
because every program event is being seen for the first time, there is very little chance of 
maintaining cost, schedule and performance.  The underpinning experience necessary to work 
through a “tried-and-true” process does not exist.   
These circumstances hold true for the Acquisition System as a whole, not just for the 
acquisition process—or little “a” (SECDEF, 2007, July) as it is generally understood within the 
acquisition community.  The distinction between little “a” and big “A” is best summarized with the 
diagram in Figure 2.  Program instability is reflective of a systemic problem inherent in the big 
“A” versus simply fixing a process problem in the little “a.”  The mythology that attends the Venn 
diagram with the intersecting circles is that there is integration among the elements of the 
Acquisition System.  The implication is that each of the elements contributes to and gains from 
being associated with the others.  The intended result is a successful program defined by being 
on cost and on schedule and performing as expected.  The reality is more accurately 
represented by Figure 3,2 in which the three elements exist independently of one another by 
virtue of the fact that changing regulations and vague Acquisition System direction combined 










                                                
2  Both Figures 2 and 3 are adaptations of figures used in the DAPA Report, p. 4. 
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Figure 2. The Acquisition System 
(This includes the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution process and the 
Requirements process in addition to the 
little “a” Acquisition process.) 
Figure 3. The Acquisition System 
(In reality, the System is not cohesive, but 
more often three independent processes 
creating program instability resulting in 
cost increases schedule slips and 
uncertain performance.) 
 
What results from the combination of changing acquisition regulations and a workforce 
that does not have a high enough number of acquisition professionals or the experience of 
seeing and working through a variety of program issues, is an inability to anticipate and prevent 
situations that put programs in jeopardy of failing the cost, schedule and performance 
standards.  The DAPA study found that unstable programs did have a workforce component 
that contributed to the instability, and though there was also recognition during the subject-
matter expert briefings that changing regulations and guidance might be troublesome in 
establishing stable programs, the combination of these two factors was not made prominent in 
the final report.  Numerous studies have recommended solutions to the shortcomings of the 
Acquisition System, but for the most part, these fixes focus on the little “a” acquisition process, 
not on the larger systemic issues.   
A focus on the acquisition process (“a”) fails to address the larger contextual issue of the 
system-driven program instability.  Mandating a rule set is necessary to establish discipline and 
structure.  “Following the rules” helps to create an acquisition program where uncertainty and 
the resulting program instability are reduced.  The need for acquisition program discipline was 
emphasized by Dr. Ashton Carter, newly confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics.  Quoted in DefenseNews.com from his written testimony presented 
at his confirmation hearing, Dr. Carter made clear his position: “Development, procurement and 
sustainment of major weapon systems require experience with the Department of Defense and 
the defense industry, systems engineering at every stage and iron discipline” (Bennett, 2009, 
March 26). 
The following are a set of rules for defense acquisition programs that resulted from the 
DAPA panel discussions, interviews, and subject-matter expert surveys conducted during the 
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DAPA project.  This paper diverges from the DAPA project in that what the 2006 study 
presented as “recommendations” for consideration by the Department of Defense are offered 
here as “rules” to be followed.  Additionally, the DAPA recommendations focused on six 
categories affecting the Acquisition System: organization, industry, workforce, requirements, 
budget and acquisition.  However, only the last three categories are addressed in this paper as 
particularly appropriate for establishing rules to abide by for the acquisition of defense weapon 
systems.  The list of rules is by no means exhaustive, but, rather, the list is intended to establish 
a foundation upon which additional rules may be considered, developed and applied.  Rules that 
all the participants in the Acquisition System play by and are accountable to adds a level of 
transparency and predictability that can provide for stable programs. 
Requirements Rules 
For the purposes of this paper, two basic types of requirements are considered: 
customer requirements and derived requirements.  Customer requirements are very 
straightforward and defined at the macro-level by approved Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs)3 and non-Key Performance Parameters.4 Derived requirements, on the other hand, are 
requirements that the customer has not specified directly as a requirement but that emerge or 
derive from the design decisions that are made (Brooksby, 2003).5   
Derived requirements are not capabilities that the customer specifically has identified.  
Particularly troublesome is a subset of derived requirements that fall into the category of 
engineering changes—those changes that improve on “good enough” and that have a combined 
effect of driving up costs and missing schedule milestones.  In the absence of rules that prevent 
pursuing this type of engineering change as a derived requirement, the guiding thought process 
follows this logic: “because we can, we should; because we should, we must; and because we 
must, we will no matter how much it costs or how long it takes.”  According to a recent Under 
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller study, prepared by Monitor Company Group, L.P. and based 
on Selected Acquisition report data, engineering changes account for approximately 33% of the 
nearly $265 billion in program cost growth from 2000 to 2007 (Monitor, 2007).  No doubt, some 
of the engineering changes were to correct design problems.  However, the engineering 
                                                
3 “Those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability and those attributes that make a significant contribution to 
the characteristics of the future joint force as defined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. KPPs 
must be testable to enable feedback from test and evaluation efforts to the requirements process. KPPs 
are validated by the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for JROC Interest documents, and by 
the DOD component for Joint Integration, Joint Information, or Independent documents. Capability 
development and capability production document KPPs are included verbatim in the acquisition program 
baseline” (CJCS, 2007, May 1).  Occasionally, (some would say all too often) KPPs cannot be achieved 
with the level of technology existing now or in the foreseeable future.  Approval of this category of KPP 
suffers from collective bad judgment, and no rule set will be a remedy.  Consequently, this article does 
not address the development of this type of requirement. 
4 Non-Key Performance Parameters are requirements that are desired by the customer but not deemed 
critical or essential. Often, these requirements represent the trade-space in programs when budget 
constraints or program execution problems demand a de-scoping of the program. 
5 Though this reference defines requirements as they apply to software development, the relevance to 
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changes that simply improve on an otherwise sufficient, specification-compliant design while 
driving up costs and impacting schedule need to be reduced or eliminated. 
As a result, what follows are recommended rules with appropriate rationale that should 
apply when considering the addition of both new customer requirements and derived 
requirements. 
Requirements Rule One: Weapon system requirements will be fixed prior to Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) or achieving Milestone B phase (see Figure 1 on page 
4). 
The prohibition of additional system requirements beyond the KPPs and the specific 
capabilities that contribute directly to them after approval for the EMD phase at Milestone B 
helps to ensure that Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be met.  Fielding weapon systems on 
schedule simply must be a program priority.  By allowing requirements to be adopted beyond 
those identified prior to EMD,  ensures that IOC will be slipped and the weapon system will not 
be fielded on schedule. 
Requirements Rule Two: From the start of EMD (Milestone B, program initiation) to IOC, 
only safety-of-flight or other safety-related engineering changes will be allowed.  The only 
exceptions are those design changes that can be proven to produce a three-to-one savings to 
investment while not missing schedule. 
This rule addresses the insidious nature of an ever-growing number of engineering 
changes that routinely skulk their way into systems development.  Additionally, the rule provides 
a potential for incentives that produce beneficial engineering changes and cost savings.  
Though some will attempt to insert engineering changes using “safety” as justification, specious 
arguments for such justification at least will have increased scrutiny, prompted by the deviation 
from rule two. 
Requirements Rule Three: Any and all additional system requirements that are deemed 
essential following the start of EMD will be developed as unique block-up grades that will be 
introduced as blocks or variations after Full Operational Capability (FOC) has been certified 
(see Figure 1 on page 4). 
There is a persistent need for a disciplined and structured way of incorporating 
meritorious capabilities enhancements to a weapon system while not disrupting the established 
design, cost, schedule, or performance.  By following this rule, there is the added benefit of 
having some level of operational experience that can inform the development and insertion of 
weapon system improvements. 
Requirements Rule Four: Holding to an established Initial Operational Capability as a 
time-certain for fielding the weapon system will be a Key Performance Parameter. 
Weapon systems development and fielding plans must have some consideration of time-
to-need as integral to the requirement for the capability.  This rule makes the time-to–need, or 
fielding, an essential consideration in program development and planning.  If there is no fully 
understood and accepted time by which a weapon system must be fielded, the importance of 








According to the DAPA report (Kadish, 2006, January), budget instability is a major 
contributor to acquisition program instability and the failure of acquisition programs to meet cost 
expectations.  Lack of funding discipline on the parts of Congress, the military, and the Defense 
Department produces acquisition programs that are targeted as bill payers for other funding 
priorities or that are under-funded because of poor cost estimating. 
In his written confirmation statement submitted to the Senate Armed Forces Committee 
and reported in DefenseNews.Com, Dr. Ashton Carter emphasized the importance of having 
“stable funding” (Bennett, 2006, March 26). He considered stable funding a key factor in 
choosing whether a weapon system contract is a fixed-price type contract or cost-plus (2006, 
March 26). 
The DAPA report offers the following solution: the establishment of a funding account for 
the duration of the acquisition program from the program initiation at the beginning of EMD to 
IOC, referred to as a “Stable Program Funding Account” (see Figure 1 on page 4). In this article, 
the term “Capital Funding” is used to describe a stable funding account during the period from 
Milestone B, EMD to IOC that is tied to specific programs and funded by the individual Services 
with a fixed budgeted amount.  Capital funding will apply initially only to MDAPs, though other 
acquisition programs could be considered.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Services will guarantee that programs identified for capital funding will not be used to pay other 
bills. 
Budget Rule One: All Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) will be evaluated as 
candidates for capital funding. 
Though not all acquisition programs are suitable for a capital funding approach, MDAPs 
should at least be considered since these programs—because of their size—offer the most 
potential for reduced cost growth based on a guaranteed stable funding profile. 
Budget Rule Two: Capital funding programs will: 
a. Have a fixed-funding profile from Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operating Capability.  
Capital funding programs will not be used as bill payers during that timeframe. 
The timeframe for capital funding allows for follow-on increases in the unit quantity for 
the acquisition program after IOC while helping to ensure that fielding the program is on time.  
Put another way, this rule helps to ensure that funding is not the reason for not fielding a 
program on time. 
b. Provide bi-annual reports to Congress on cost-schedule and performance progress. 
Congress’s responsibility and right for oversight of Defense spending must be 
addressed.  By engaging with congressional staffs and principals to keep them informed of how 
effectively the Defense Department is spending taxpayer dollars for acquisition programs, the 
needs of Congress will be addressed.  Frequent, statutorily mandated program reviews will 
provide Congress the opportunity to assess not only the program’s progress but also the 
effectiveness of capital funding.  The program should be reviewed with Congress twice 
annually.  This provides congressional staff and principals an early understanding of developing 
trends.  Failure to have a successful review (over cost, behind schedule or failing to perform) is 
addressed later in this paper. 
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c. Have a Technology Readiness Level of at least 6 at Milestone B (EMD). 
Programs that move into EMD that do not have a Technology Readiness Level of 6 or 
better are destined to experience cost escalation, schedule slips, and unpredictable 
performance.  Capital funding is predicated on the fact that costs can be controlled and 
schedule can be maintained.  For capital funding to be effective, all aspects of an acquisition 
program must have as much stability as possible.   
d. Be “time-certain” programs. 
Capital funding success depends on strict adherence to a fully-agreed-to timeframe (by 
the government and the contractor) from Milestone B approval for EMD to IOC.  This provides 
predictability regarding what to expect in the program in general. It also drives the government 
and industry program managers to be realistic in what they promise for the program and in how 
they propose to meet the program milestones to stay within the timeframe for system fielding.   
e. Be cancelled if the program fails to meet established cost, schedule, and performance. 
If a program fails to meet any one of the cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
established at program initiation after three consecutive congressional reviews, the program will 
be cancelled; not re-baselined or re-planned—cancelled.  When government and industry 
program managers as well as the military departments and Defense Department program 
executives fully understand the consequences of program failure, the likely result will be greater 
management attention. 
Acquisition Rules 
Analysis of acquisition programs over time shows that programs generally grow about 
50% in cost (Younossi et al.,  2006).  Larger Defense programs clearly are more prominent 
when analyzing program cost growth because the amounts of money are very large compared 
to programs managed by other Federal agencies.  Though it may seem obvious, programs that 
have longer timeframes for EMD also experience greater cost growth (Younossi et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, missing from most, if not all, acquisition strategies is analysis that asks: “What 
does time, as an independent variable, do to the trade space defined by the minimum and 
optimum performance and cost?” 
To address the importance of time as a consideration in developing acquisition 
strategies, the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked The Monitor Group 
(2003) to look at the value of establishing time as a boundary condition or driver in determining 
the desired timeframe between Milestone B and IOC. Time should be considered an 
independent variable, as should cost, especially when it is critical to field a capability in time to 
have a positive impact on a threat. 
Time is not the only factor that works against well-run acquisition programs.  We have 
developed an acquisition-workforce culture that has adopted “flexibility” as a means to acquiring 
more capable weapon systems, other equipment, and services.  The consequence of this 
culture is that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the acquisition community to establish 
the broadest interpretation of what constitutes best value, desired technology, and solicitation 
outcome.  Unfortunately, “flexibility” often comes at the expense of discipline and structure as a 
means to achieve cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
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Successful competitive solicitations, however, depend on discipline and structure in the 
way that the acquisition competition is managed.  Competition management begins with 
development of and adherence to an acquisition management/master plan or strategy.  That 
plan or strategy should inform the Request for Proposal and is the roadmap for the subsequent 
competition and program management. 
Acquisition Rule One: No MDAP will be considered for Milestone B certification without a 
comprehensive Single Acquisition Management Plan/Strategy to include at a minimum total 
system procurement quantity, explanation and rationale for the contracting methodology 
selected (i.e., prime contractor choosing subcontractors, leader-follower prime contractors, etc.), 
sustainment plan and how the Prime Contractor or Lead Systems Integrator will select and 
manage subcontractors. 
Most, if not all, programs that experience significant problems with cost, schedule, and 
performance have inadequate or flawed acquisition strategies or management plans.  Often, the 
focus of the acquisition strategy is on what the weapon system should do, the plans of the 
Military Services to field the system, and the phasing of the number of units over time that are 
required.  This approach, while important, does not comprise an acquisition strategy or 
management plan.  The acquisition strategy should explain how the competition will be run; 
what management, technical, and cost elements are most important; and whether it will be a 
winner-take-all (and why that is the preferred choice), split-buy, leader/follower strategy, or 
some combination of each.  These considerations in an acquisition strategy are important and 
will drive necessary program decisions in the follow-on program management. 
Management and acquisition strategies should consider what must be fielded and when 
and how block upgrades will be completed, managed, and integrated after full operating 
capability is achieved.  The acquisition strategy must describe how the winning contractor will 
manage subcontractor content.  An annex to the acquisition strategy must be how the weapon 
system competition will be financed, and consideration must be given to any subsystem’s 
commercial value in terms of design buy-back and production rights.  In the past, the 
Department has either retained all of the design rights or retained none of the rights.  Retaining 
substantial design rights while keeping open the opportunity for the contractor to benefit from 
any commercial markets that might emerge makes competing for the Department’s business 
more appealing.   
Acquisition Rule Two: All MDAPs will be evaluated as “time-certain” programs, where 
the timeframe between Milestone B and IOC (see Figure 1 on page 4) will be established with a 
thorough analysis, using Time as an Independent Variable (TAIV). Additionally, the criteria that 
describe what must be accomplished in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly 
change.  
When TAIV is applied to the development of an acquisition program, the importance of 
time in developing and defining the technology, as well as its design and production factors, are 
given prominence in the analysis of cost, schedule, and achieving the desired performance.  
Time-certain in this instance is not synonymous with schedule.  Schedule is the sequential 
distribution of program events that, on completion, have a timeframe associated with them.  We 
measure schedule with milestones accomplished.  TAIV, on the other hand, is the analytic 
construct that identifies which out of a given list of performance capabilities are of marginal 
value when considering the amount of time necessary for a capability to be developed, 
incorporated  into the weapon system, and fielded.  The time-certain period is established with 
the results of the TAIV analysis.  Schedule is, then, the sequence of events or program 
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milestones that fit within the time-certain period. Though a recent Government Accountability 
report (GAO, 2009) points out that the DAPA report (Kadish, 2006, January, p.49) 
recommended that schedule be a Key Performance Parameter, this rule departs from DAPA in 
that the time between Milestone B and IOC be a time-certain period and that specific length of 
time be a Key Performance Parameter.  Urgency for fielding a particular desired capability, then, 
has a context that can be used to describe what needs to be fielded or deployed and when. 
Acquisition Rule Three: Aircraft programs will take no longer than five years from 
Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operational Capability, again using TAIV as an analytic tool to 
validate the optimum timeframe. 
Successful aircraft programs have been fielded in five years or less.  The fielding of both 
the F-15 and F-16 were achieved in approximately five years, with the F-15E  (Woods, 2008) 
fielded in approximately five-and-one-half years.  Had management and budget attention been 
constant and sufficient, the C-17 cargo aircraft could have achieved IOC in five years. But after 
several false starts, it took almost 10 years.  The complexity of the aircraft’s technology 
demands is clearly important, but other factors seem to play roles as well.  The EA-18G is 
planned for five years and nine months from Milestone B to IOC while the F/A-18E/F was 
planned for nine years and four months. It is true, however, that the EA-18G is basically an F/A-
18F airframe integrated with an Improved Capability III, Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) 
avionics suite (employed on the EA-6B) and should take less time to field.  The accelerated 
development schedule (over its F/A-18E/F predecessor) probably can be attributed to the 
coupling of that proven, in-production airframe with an existing AEA technology.  
The B-2 took 18 years from Milestone B to IOC for a variety of reasons, only some of 
which had to do with available technology.  Budget and congressional interest played big roles 
in the length of time that it took for the B-2 to reach IOC.  At 14 years and four months, the F-22 
has taken the longest of any of the fighters to reach IOC.  If the rules are followed that require 
capital funding and not being certified for EMD without achieving a TRL of 6, it is not a stretch 
for a well-managed program with stable funding that follows all of the rules described in this 
paper to reach IOC in five years.  However, when the program becomes a bill payer for other 
Service needs or derived requirements are inserted before or during the EMD phase, five years 
will, of course, be a difficult achievement.  The criteria that describe what must be accomplished 
in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly change. 
Acquisition Rule Four: Ship-building programs will take no longer than seven years from 
Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operational Capability, again using TAIV as an analytic tool to 
validate the optimum timeframe. 
Currently, the average time from Milestone B to IOC for US Navy ships entering the fleet 
is eight years, nine-and-one-half months (Costello, 2008).  Size and complexity, however, do 
not seem to be what determines the length of time to get combat ships into the fleet.  The range 
is from CVN21 (Gerald R. Ford Class modern aircraft carrier) taking 12-and-one-half years to 
strategic sealift ships taking five years, nine months.  But, again, complexity or size does not 
seem to be the driving factor since a Supply Class Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE6) took over 
eight-and-one-half years to go from Milestone B to IOC while the aircraft carrier CVN74, USS 
John C. Stennis, took a little over eight years, four months to achieve IOC.  An LPD 17 San 
Antonio Class amphibious docking ship took 11 years and one month to reach IOC while the 
Arleigh Burke Class (DDG 51) destroyer took nine years, three months to go from Milestone B 
to IOC.  Arguably, to establish seven years as the time-certain for naval shipbuilding programs 
from program initiation at Milestone B to IOC will be a challenge—but a challenge that can be 
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met if the time-certain constraint is one that both the contractor and the Department understand 
and capture in their Integrated Master Plan and Integrated Master Schedule.  Also, the criteria 
that describe what must be accomplished in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly 
change. 
Acquisition Rule Five: Requests for Proposals (RFP) will include a competition element 
that asks how the competitors plan to select, manage, and evaluate their subcontractors.  
Subcontractor management will be an element of the Contractor Performance Assessment 
report and considered in determining award and incentive fees. 
With regard to the issue of subcontractor management raised in Rule Four, how the 
winning prime contractor intends to select and manage its subcontractors and suppliers will be a 
prominent competition element in the Request for Proposal (RFP).  The purpose of this rule is to 
discourage potential prime contractors from arbitrarily, and as the default position, choosing 
sister divisions as subcontractors.  If a competitor must explain the rationale for selecting 
subcontractors’ contributions and their cost and design advantages compared to sister divisions 
or other alternatives, sister divisions may not be as appealing of a choice as a program 
subcontractor.  Knowing that the plan for selecting and managing subcontractors will be 
weighted in the management section of the RFP will provide more incentive to the potential 
prime contractor to give very careful consideration to subcontractor selection.  Profit-on-profit 
should become more of a competitive liability. 
Acquisition Rule Six: No MDAP will be considered for Milestone B certification without a 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan that has been agreed to and approved. 
All too often, the test and evaluation process results in new requirements that exceed 
contract specifications.  Ensuring that a fully agreed-to and approved Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan that clearly bounds the limits of what can be tested, including metrics for success 
that all understand, is essential.  This will go a long way to precluding testing the driving 
engineering changes and requirements that exceed the contract defined design. 
Acquisition Rule Seven: Where the competitors offerings are comparable and the 
competition will allow, competitors for EMD will submit cost-model data and Most Probable Cost 
will be determined prior to final Request for Proposal release and shared with competitors.  
Most Probable Cost will be contract cost.  Competitions will be based on technical and 
management risk. 
A long-held view in the defense industry is that any program vice president who loses a 
cost competition by not having the lowest cost is fired.  What exactly drives the industry to hold 
this point of view?  If you don’t count their years of experience, a winning contractor believes 
that there is a better than 80% probability that the contract specifications that were bid will be 
changing as the ink is drying on the contract.  The winning contractor can then charge full price 
on the updated program specifications, within the cost and pricing guidelines, and make up for 
any risk accepted in the original winning proposal.   
This approach to an acquisition program is most often prevalent when the contract is a 
cost-plus arrangement, though fixed-price contracts experience the same type of expanding-
contract cost growth with the emergence of derived requirements and engineering changes.  
The problem that occurs with fixed-price contracts that have engineering changes or derived 
requirements is that unless the contract is amended, the cost of the changes often turns up as 
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claims against the government.  Cost-plus contracts, on the other hand, only have the added 
costs show up as the “plus” in cost-plus.   
The excuse often heard when costs rise is that the Department and the defense 
contractors do not have good cost estimates.  This assertion does not generally prove to be 
true.  When competing contractors reveal the output of their cost models and compare them 
with the Department’s estimates, there is often very little difference.  As a general rule, then, all 
the participants in acquisition competitions have a very good estimate of what the costs will be.  
Why then are competitions based on cost when everyone knows what the most likely cost will 
be?  Cost should be taken off the table and the competition should be about which competitor 
has the better solution for management and technical risk, with subcontractor selection and 
management being prominent in that evaluation. Most Probable Cost, or the cost that the 
competitors and government models agree is the cost, should become the contract cost. 
Acquisition Rule Eight: Competitions will be based on the motto: “the design you bid is 
the design you build.”   
A number of activities take place while the ink is drying on the contract.  Not the least of 
these is that the government program manager and executive are saying to the winning 
contractor, “We know what we said we wanted, and what you proposed, but we have a few 
changes to the requirements we’d like you to adopt.”  To which the winning contractor readily 
replies, “Not a problem; just a few design changes, another year on the program, and an 
increase in cost.”  If both the winning contractor and the government program manager fully 
understand and believe that the design that was bid is the design that will be built, then their 
behavior will change to  follow the rule. 
Conclusion 
The Department of Defense is now in a budget environment where it is directly 
competing with a formidable domestic agenda that will not be denied.  In his January 2009 
article A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon For A New Age, published in 
Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated,  
In recent years, these platforms have grown ever more baroque, have become ever 
more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities.  
Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for 
capability is perhaps reaching a point of diminishing returns.  A given ship or aircraft, no 
matter how capable or well equipped, can be in only one place at one time. (Gates, 
2009)   
If Secretary Gates’ message is going to be taken to heart by those charged with 
acquiring the “platforms” and those responsible for producing them, then far greater attention 
must be given to using the defense budget wisely, efficiently and effectively.  Programs simply 
must be managed to cost, schedule and performance.  A mandated set of rules that drive 
discipline into the Acquisition System is one answer. 
This paper describes a few such rules that are worthy of implementing.  They are by no 
means inclusive of all the rules that should be considered and established.  Additionally, it 
should be clearly understood that for behaviors to change, all of the rules must be followed 
since no single rule or group of rules stands alone.  For example, without a time-certain 
program, the discipline for capital funding will not be present and planning for funding over a 
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well-defined time period will not be possible.  The rules are interrelated, and these rules are 
necessary in order to re-establish an acquisition culture that is disciplined with a clear 
understanding of how to bring predictability and stability to the Department of Defense 
Acquisition System.   
The institution of rules that are clearly communicated and consistent must be enforced to 
reinvigorate and support the acquisition workforce’s enthusiasm for meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance as well as establishing discipline and structure in the Acquisition System.  The 
Department of Defense establishes and follows checklists for any number of activities from 
flying airplanes to mailing packages.  Rules are just another form of a checklist.  With 91 major 
Defense Acquisition Programs with a combined value of over $1.6 trillion currently being 
managed, the result will be getting better weapon systems into the hands of the warfighter in 
time to make a difference on the battlefield. 
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